sometimes undesirable convictions are demanding their legitimization.
Our understanding of what scientific rigor is becomes open to new possibilities, although some of them may bring us into new discords. Methodology-which cannot be dissociated from a given theoretical proposition-accounts for some of these difficulties. It ultimately objectifies the theory's epistemological project, and this is just the tip of the iceberg.
Moscovici's social representations theory (SRT) addresses many of these problems, but leaves us also with many challenges. I chose it as an example mainly because, besides its presence in Latin American countries, it is part of the current trend for a cultural psychology. Therefore it has many aspects in common with other theories, mostly socio-constructionist ones. That means bringing up a new proposal that enlightens the discussion of challenges of research, as I shall try to demonstrate.
The Re-humanization of Psychology
In the past, researchers have tried to isolate aspects of human experience, such as feelings and beliefs, and, in a way, have tried to neutralize them. Cultural psychology has contributed to the re-humanization of psychology as its objects of study are left unified. There is no such a thing as a subject without feelings and beliefs. At the same time, there is no subject-be it individual or social-external to culture, if it is to be considered as a part of a sense-making process.
Culture, the way it is being dealt with nowadays, is one of the axes of the destabilization of knowledge, as it brings symbolism and communication into psychological consideration, no longer as a context, but as a constituent of the object, which leads to important methodological reconsideration. Since Descartes, culture has been seen as a 'shared mistake', due to its customary character. The domination of reason over popular beliefs, common sense and tradition has placed culture-'a weave of illusions' (Moscovici, 1993, p. 52 )-under the censorship of science. Nevertheless, part of its function is to provide 'representations of causalities, time etc., that will allow survival within a logical process' (Moscovici, 1993, p. 55) . This means that society may not always be incoherent or illusory when it chooses elementary forms of religion, apparently absurd beliefs or fantastic cosmogonies, as Durkheim has described. These constitute a means to understand and cope with reality. They all contain their own logic; different kinds of knowledge serve different purposes, but are equally functional and effective, even 'rational' in their own terms. Folk knowledge, like folk sciences, is well structured and very rich. It is part of the rationality of culture.
In an interview published in Culture & Psychology, Marková considered the interest of cultural knowledge for the construction of representations and Moscovici claimed that culture would be 'the third term between society and the individual' (Moscovici & Marková, 1998, p. 385) . He insisted on the importance of considering it in its diversity. Lay knowledge, as much as science, makes sense of the world. In this way, culture functions as a kind of method to relate to the world, providing a guide for us to understand it, think about it and act upon it. Lévy-Bruhl (1938) explained that every society has its own categorization, its own imagination in its relationship with the world, for internal and external communication and for coexisting with others.
The reintroduction of culture in the agenda of psychology, after considerable absence, takes place in an atmosphere of change in several fields of human knowledge. However, if we analyze the history of our field, we will come to the conclusion that, from Wundt onwards, culture has repeatedly entered and exited the scene, in a discontinuous process. The interest that psychology has shown in culture, as well as in specific traditions, has gone in waves, as Valsiner and van der Veer (2000) describe it. The sociogenetic tradition, for instance, 'has been flourishing in contexts in which the given society has been in a phase of social upheaval, with hope for its basic change into a new (and better!) state' (Valsiner & van der Veer, 2000, p. 3). Culture itself seems to make its appearance in contexts of ongoing change: Wundt's psychology of peoples (Völkerpsychologie) was inspired by migration in Europe in his time. In our present times, the waves of migration gained momentum in the 1970s, when important aspects of Western cultures were being questioned, and meaning became the central focus in the social sciences (Bruner, 1986) .
The present world situation is even more comprehensive. It deepens the interest of psychologists in context (Bruner, 1990) as well as in symbolism. Psychology now focuses on meaning and interpretation. It takes culture as a component of subjectivity and as a construction in progress. This implies that we should consider the dimension of communication as one of the motors of such production. Banchs (2003) clearly shows the importance of shared representations mentioned by Moscovici: they eliminate the problematic character of everyday communication, of the 'spontaneous' consensus. We would not be able to have a shared existence without this coincidence of feelings or behaviors that are understood by all. The relation between communication and representation is indissoluble, and communication is a process of transformation of these representations, in which we mingle our own representations with those of other groups. The scenario for this mixture, this possibility of communication in society, is a tributary of culture, with its enormous hegemonic representations, institutionalized habits and pre-theoretical thought, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) would say.
The importance of culture and history has increasingly gained recognition among social psychologists (Jodelet, 2000) . Contemporary psycho-sociological theories, such as SRT, as part of this movement (Farr, 1993) , cannot overlook culture or history, once the raw material it deals with is both constituent of and partly constituted by naïve popular knowledge, the knowledge of common sense, which propels the expression of that culture and makes communication possible. In reality, social representations have reactivated the interface between psychology and anthropology, as Farr (1993) once observed. According to him, SRT places psychology in the field of humanities. He thus rejects its former insertion in the field of natural sciences, which has deeply influenced psychology with its investigative method. This could be one of the reasons for the resistance Farr found among AngloSaxon circles and others who were deeply engaged with the current paradigm.
In Brazil and in Latin America, the cycle of approximation and detachment from the humanist aspect of psychology can also be observed. After Manuel Bonfim, 1 at the beginning of the 20th century, the work of Dante Moreira Leite (1954 Leite ( /1992 )-the only study from social psychology used as a reference in the debates on Brazilian identity of the 1950s and 1960s-criticized the idea of a Brazilian national character and was abandoned after psychology was reoriented towards a more individualizing perspective, reinforced by the university education reform carried out during the military dictatorship. As Duveen (2000) stated, 'throughout the last century, whenever "social" forms of social psychology have emerged we have witnessed the same drama of exclusion which marked the reception of Wundt's work' (p. 4). Re-humanization then flourished in the midst of the continental crisis that psychology was undergoing in the late 1970s, when local interpretation, combined with an interest in broader aspects, emerged in social psychology in Latin American countries. Moscovici and Tajfel, in the 1960s, and more recently Bruner, were among the spokesmen for the general dissatisfaction towards the deficiencies of traditional research.
Bruner expresses his disenchantment when he criticizes the failure of the cognitive revolution in psychology. The use of 'very Culture & Psychology 9(4) 342 individualist terms' that characterize the philosophy of psychology (Bruner, 1990) will have to give room to familiar aspects of human sciences that have been ignored: humans are not limited to their skin; they are the expression and the agents of their culture. We are not defined only by biology associated with a vague a-historical and atemporal environment. Re-humanized psychology brings us back into our own context, penetrates our culture and history so as to try to understand their meanings, which we reinterpret in order to communicate with each other and deal with reality. This re-humanization has made our research projects more complex, or perhaps more dangerous, as the subjectivity of self and others is no longer excluded or neutralized-neither is its context. Yet with these new risks come new possibilities as the breadth of our studies and perhaps their consequences are expanded.
Broader Scenarios for New Research Paths
Nowadays we need a new, broader scenario, where psychology can encounter other fields that seek to understand humanity. Healthy uncertainty and destabilization of the categories of knowledge (Harding, 1986) are needed in order to generate new observations, such as those in the Annales school and in feminist theories. The 'insularity' of psychology (Duveen, 1998b) , however, hampered its interchange with other related sciences that were in the process of reviewing their own dogmas. Fortunately, we are now experiencing the disclosure of psychology. It left the laboratory and entered the real world, where it shall start a debate with other disciplines in order to better achieve its aim. This will make its canon more flexible and promote an approximation towards other forms of research endorsed by related areas, such as participative observation, ethnography and documental research, among others.
Dealing with reality and taking culture into consideration, however, require the use of other research tools not always legitimate in the eyes of the scientific canon in psychology. We shall have to overcome 'the instrument law' conceived by Duncker (Bauer, Gaskell, & Allum, 2000) : the case of the little boy who only knew the hammer and therefore thought that everything needed a pounding. No technique is the royal road for social research, and psychology is more and more aware of the need to make use of those different methods coming from other disciplines in different social situations. The psyche does not come only from inside the individual. It is the product and producer of relations with others and with the environment. It thus requires diverse methodological approaches in order to capture its complexity.
We are entering a new age characterized by the reform of human thought (Morin, 1999) that reveals the complexity of our object and the innocent wish that we can encompass it within a single field of knowledge. This change in focus throws psychology into interdisciplinarity. Certainly, this is a difficult one-way journey. The destabilizing elements of what I have called re-humanization of psychology (although it could also be seen as the increase of complexity) are indicators of the paradigmatic transition mentioned by Souza Santos (2000) . According to him, this transition is directed to a second epistemological rupture: besides the rupture that has transported us from common sense to science, we now realize that it is necessary to abandon the recently developed methods of science to return to another kind of common sense that has been transformed by the very presence of science itself; a common sense with a positive aspect that we were not always able to recognize, and that, at the same time, we must modify and improve. SRT is an example of this new proposition since it deals with turning science into popular knowledge, and with investigating how lay thinking is construed.
That is the reason why the social representations approach constitutes a theoretical heuristic instrument that will allow us to increase our understanding of social reality and provide us with tools to intervene in it. . . . Only a study of the processes and products by means of which individuals and groups build up and interpret their world and their lives would allow the integration of social and cultural dimensions with history, as a guided diachronic evolution. (Jodelet, 2000, pp. 9-10) So far we have intended to clear the way in at least two directions: one leads towards other fields of knowledge, towards an interchange with other disciplines; and the other, towards other injunctions of knowledge-research as a social practice. Banchs (2003) insists that in Latin America there has been a constant effort to respond to the proposition of Santos (2000, p. 74) : 'to create prudent knowledge for a decent life', that is, to bring forth knowledge that is conscious of its consequences and is capable of establishing, in the process of its formation, distinct relations with the objects of study, with the world as a whole, and with the recipients of the information it produces. Santos warns us of the frequently neglected dangers of research. In the exercise of science, his proposition combines an ethical and a political concern. According to Jovchelovitch (personal communication, 21 September 2000) , it is time to be plain and clear: what is the object of this knowledge, where does it lead us, and how do we construct it? We should then direct our Culture & Psychology 9(4) attention, no longer focused on results and achievements of science alone, to the consequences of scientific developments for its recipients. Such change contains an underlying concept of the human being and his or her relation with the world that verges upon Santos's expectations. We can see some of this in the peculiarities of the application of the social representation model in Latin America, partially credited to prospective social changes:
. . . the social representations model followed a different path in Latin America. Adopted for its critical quality within social psychology, it also provided theoretical and even methodological instruments for the definition of its specific object, thus allowing both empirical investigation and intervention. Researchers were also concerned with another particularity of this model: its adaptation to fundamental aspects such as understanding and respect towards the individuals and the groups the researcher works with. (Jodelet, 2000, pp. 15-16) In this scenario where culture plays the protagonist in the renovation of psychology, as it reveals new limits and requirements for research, SRT holds a privileged position as pioneer. It is also in this environment that the present cultural change stimulates critical approaches to scientific production, and not only referring to its efficacy. This will definitely have an impact on methodology, as we will see below.
'Theorimethod' or Symbiotic Relations
A method, like data, does not exist independently. It is linked to the conception of the object and the way we choose to become acquainted with it. This has to do with the way we interpret the construction of knowledge and the position of the human being in this process. The epistemology-ontology-methodology formula is still valid, although it may have lost its momentum. Farr (1993) insisted on the necessity of a consonance between theory and method. In reality, the paradigmatic transition goes further and suggests that there should be more flexibility between counterparts such as subject/object, emotion/reasoning, researcher/researched, nature/culture (Santos, 2000) . In consonance with some feminist theories that were also impelled to deal with the dismantlement of cultural and scientific beliefs so as to establish a new interpretation of their object of study, we understand that method is not only a description of 'how to do it', or merely instructions for research, but implies a specific approach to the object of study. Nicholson (1999) , for instance, in a study that rejects the binary approach to the masculine and feminine bodies, leads us to the conclusion that method ranges from the choice of presuppositions Arruda Living is Dangerous to the level of generalization it may accept. In light of the rise of an epistemological perspective, method is, in a way, the perception of the limitations of a proposition. It defines the scope and boundaries of the empirical research as well as the limits of the theoretical devices. It establishes the principle of reality within the search for knowledge.
In the symbiotic relation between method and theory, the rise of one and the fading of the other may be as fluid as the subject/object relation in the social construction of reality. This does not mean that the theory should be either evaded or tied to some specific method. On the contrary, it is necessary that both be carefully integrated, case by case. Moscovici categorically defended the non-closure of SRT. Duveen (1998a) , in a previous argument in Culture & Psychology, claims that this vagueness stems from Moscovici's 'conviction that the phenomena of social representations are themselves in need of clarification and description' (p. 456). Duveen considers that this logic of vagueness should also be seen in the context of the history of social psychology, where precision of argument has often been sought at the cost of engagement with social phenomena.
One of the consequences of that choice for vagueness was to open the way for the application of several methodologies, emphasizing the search for innovation instead of the search for confirmation. As a result of this we can find not only different approaches of the theory, 2 but also other theories or concepts, some of them coming from other disciplines. Nowadays social memory (Jodelet, 2002; Sá & Oliveira, 2002) and the imaginary (Arruda, 2002) have started to be integrated into social representations research as concepts intended to enhance the study of social ideation; others, related to minority influence (Banchs & Lozada, 2000) , seek to understand change and innovation. This may be indicating a future trend. Is it giving us a hint as to what will become of psychosocial theories in the future?
The Construction of the Idea
What can this openness of methodological possibilities mean for researchers attempting to construct ideas in this new era? Fritz Heider (1958) provided an example of the difficulties faced due to methodological inflexibility: 'In an operational definition, the concept is given meaning by the method used in arriving at it, as for example, defining intelligence as that which is measured by an intelligence test ' (p. 8) . This means that the notably important operational concern is able to characterize phenomena that seem to have been measured but not so clearly explained, that is, insisting on measurement does not provide enough clarification. 3 Therefore, when common sense offers some meaning for them, it is actually making them objective, merging concept with method. And it may be trying to tell us something. Can we compare the use of computer programs for quantitative analysis with the intelligence tests carried out? Indubitably, the difficulties of approaching a concept may facilitate this kind of objectification, tying it to a method that can detect the phenomenon. Also according to Heider (1958) , going deeper into conceptual development is a definite prerequisite for the development of a scientific study and its application. This is certainly one of the challenges that will be imposed on methodological orientations.
Methodological inflexibility also reflects conceptual difficulties, as the two are intertwined in the researcher's interpretations of the world. For the time being, it is important to remember that the use of programs represents an important technical support, but it cannot dismiss the researcher's job. Until now, the final touch, the interpretation, is the analyst's job. Just as an object may assume different shapes depending on the group that represents it, the data obtained in a research project may assume some surprising forms, depending on the person who analyzes them.
It is in this subtle frontier that researchers do their job when they consider psychology to be an interpretative science (Geertz, 1973) . The construction of methodology, from this point of view, is not aimed at establishing indistinctly applicable formulas. On the contrary, when we deal with meaning, as in anthropology and history, it can be compared to the job of a craftsman-a job that neither begins nor ends with the collection of data. It actually begins before that, with the observation of the conditions for the production of representations. We then engage ourselves with a prolonged interpretation of these representations, or other psychosocial phenomena, and, before it is concluded, it incites the researcher with an incessant query: What now? Therefore, it seems that our task does not end with the interpretation of collected data. This ties us to the last aspect of this study, which is related to some of the challenges presented to us. An interpretation drawn in perspective would fit well here, one that is concerned with how we can build another problematic once results are obtained. How can we develop communication from the analyzed phenomenon, or what alternatives of communication will this analysis provide us with? When these questions arise, we have an indication that the construction of methodology, as rigorous as it may be, doesn't establish neutrality, as it does not exempt us from being committed with our own objectives. It may, however, grant us some objectiveness, that is, some Arruda Living is Dangerous respect and understanding towards the object. Habermas (1987) , like Latour and Woolgar (1979) , Santos (2000) and many others, warns that interests may sway the investigative action (Bauer et al., 2000) , indicating that research may also be seen as a social practice. Considering these injunctions, methodology alone is incapable of avoiding the risks of serving certain interests that may not always be commendable.
Methodology is simply a way to deal with dualities; it is an exercise of the limitations of the possibilities of investigation, of the possibilities of the researcher, as well as of the possibilities of the object, context and research itself. To be able to deal with such complexity, we should not halt before old dichotomies: why not resort to quantitative analysis, once we make sure that this will provide us with the elements to accomplish our interpretation? In reality, quantitative and qualitative analyses are but a part of the constant tensions we must evaluate. We deal with dualities, like so many other aspects, as dangers of research, without them necessarily being so.
Therefore, methodology is a means of negotiation to allow us to move among and within these tensions. As a matter of fact, methodology is always a consequence of a long process of negotiation. Negotiation occurs between the researcher's aspiration for knowledge, his/her conceptual preferences, his/her philosophical and ideological principles, and the possibilities of accomplishing these hopes. Methodology must also consider objective and material conditions as well as the command of theoretical aspects and the ability of the researcher. It is, in a way, a negotiation between the principle of pleasure and that of reality, seen within the scope of the scientific practice. Here we may include the policies and interests that encompass research and the researcher's personal strategies, since research is neither impersonal nor disembodied.
The present challenge for the construction of methodology is not related to false dichotomies. On the contrary, it is due to the very character of both the investigative action and our object. The object for socio-constructionist psychology is situated in history and culture. It remains mobile, being rigid and fluid. A social representation, for example, is simultaneously constituted by reason and emotion and combines memory with aspiration. It expresses both our curiosity and our ambition. But methodology is also a product of the extension of the limits we must deal with.
In this search, as Marx might have said, nothing methodological is unfamiliar to us. We will not hesitate to turn to our neighbors. Anthropology teaches us to discover how acts and symbols get their meaning from the culture; sociology helps to understand the imprint and ratio of the social in human behavior; literary theory, on the other hand, sheds light on the interpretation of the affective dimension conveyed by fiction and poetry, for, as the French say, the poet is the anthem of the human race. Meaning is neither immaterial nor disembodied. It is symbolically and historically constructed through human action, communication and thought, to which it ultimately incorporates itself. It is a permanent challenge that is constantly being renewed, since it originates, develops and ends within these spheres.
Theory and Method in the Example of SRT
Below is a simplified description of some of the core principles of SRT's epistemological project, which serves as a guide for adopting research strategies. As some of these principles are shared by socioconstructionist psychology as a whole, they may help in this exercise of considering methodology to be an inseparable consequence of theoretical and epistemological premises:
• Reality is socially constructed, therefore it blurs the limits between subject and object.
• This constructed reality is based on the interaction/communication process.
• The forms of knowledge, which construct this reality and which equally constitute forms of communication, are different from each other yet equivalent-the consensual and reified universes are differentiated forms of communication, yet each one serves its function and communicates with the other. • The knowing subject is active and creative, relying on his notional stock as well as on his/her values, interests, and projects to decipher anything that is new to him/her. • In complex, multifaceted societies, in the era of information and high-speed communication, social representation is characteristic of the organization of social thought;
Given these premises, let us consider the impact on the methodological propositions. The constructionist premise creates a debate in certain areas about whether or not reality exists, a question that is not included within the scope of this discussion.
As far as SRT is concerned, a representation of something is also the representation of the person who constructs it. This can be translated into methodology in specific ways. The 'person who constructs it' bases this construction on a realm of symbolism and life experience that provides the ground for his or her reading of the world. Thus we Arruda Living is Dangerous return to the discussion on the role of culture and history, thereby reaffirming the contextual nature of social representing. If, on the one hand, we expand our boundaries as much as possible so as to reach the notional perimeter that harbors social representations, on the other, it is the very notion of limits contained in the propositions (limits of the possibilities offered by the object and the method, and, consequently, limits of generalization and interpretation itself) that translates the premise into methodological terms. This aspect has been discussed by Wagner (1998) and Sá (1998) in relation to the criteria used for defining a representation, or an object of representation. As for the limits of method, there is the risk of 'methodolatry'-the belief that method, or techniques (with which method is often confused), will uncover 'truth'. The introduction of computer programs as a tool for performing content or lexical analyses, for instance, risks provoking such a reaction, and in light of this electronic fascination it merits a representations study: what is there in computer programs that makes people take them for granted and believe they have magical powers? 'Methodolatry' trusts artifacts to produce instant interpretation and objectifies the study of the phenomenon through graphic representations. It is fair to assert that these risks are partly due to deficiencies in theoretical mastery.
Another point linked to the same constructionist premise leads to a question that will be discussed further on: the shift of positions between researcher and researched. This shift blurs the boundaries between the 'I' and the rest of the world, the object and the subject, as well as those boundaries between reason and emotion, reality and illusion, thought and action. It is not always easy for the investigator to find his or her place among these broken lines, and the influence of old research habits often undermines any theoretical prospect for change. Communication plays a significant role in this general sphere of limits. It opens the way for investigation and for the construction of meaning. Data collection usually establishes communication with the universe being studied, and both directions of this communication between researcher and researched deserve our attention. There are dangers in both directions, as one side may affect the other's integrity or quality of the outcome. The use of combined methods has proven to be productive, not merely as a means to provide any kind of validation of data, but also as a way to enable observation of the object from different angles, therefore exposing more of its complexities-a vision certainly shared by SRT.
The basic vision that elevates subject and naïve thought (subjects are active and creative in their relation with the world, and popular Culture & Psychology 9(4) 350 wisdom and common sense are effective and serve their purpose) intersects with the idea that communication enables social construction. Language, therefore, becomes relevant, and a few assumptions can be made at this point.
There is a repercussion in terms of the relation between researcher and researched. The shift in both positions crushes science's pedestal to bring it down to the same level as other types of knowledge. It thus introduces curious, wisdom-seeking amateurs as producers of knowledge and brings this knowledge to the core of daily communication. In research, this will be reflected by procedures that seek as much spontaneity as possible from the subject. After all, the relation established with those who offer the raw material for the study does not exist only during data collection; the informant should not be seen as an instrument. At the same time that ethics should not ignore the guarantee of anonymity and informed consent, neither should it be reduced to a research protocol. Where this information will go and the care of returning the data to those who supplied them are part of a methodological approach-that is, if the methodology is understood as the other side of theory, as coexisting with its epistemological project, which considers the anonymous subject as a whole being who has the gift of discernment and whose knowledge is a source of reflection and deserves respect. This congruency with the epistemological project broadens the scope of ethics to the periods before and after research, considering what Santos (2000) suggests: to create prudent knowledge for a decent life. Yet here another challenge arises that is not only related to methodology, but that also leads us to the methodological equivalent of the same core principle of non-hierarchical diversity of thought that originates from creativity and communication between subjects.
Foregrounding of the respondent.
This does not mean discarding the researcher's interpretative work on the subject's text, be it an oral, written, gestural, iconic or any other type of testimony. This study does not reduce itself to picking out and grouping pieces of discourse, to searching for or establishing categories. Alongside the primary focus on the subject's text is not only caution and respect from the researcher's side when dealing with the subject of his/her research, but also the need to have enough theoretical and practical familiarity to reflect upon the subject. In Brazil, anthropologists (Cardoso, 1986; Durham, 1986) have warned against the trivialization of participatory research, such as the kind that risks Arruda Living is Dangerous enthroning spontaneous discourse-the antonym of what was described above as 'methodolatry'. Since it bestows the highest degree of reliability upon the researched and their testimonies, participatory research runs the risk of promoting the belief that words speak for themselves and that a systemized exposition would be sufficient to substitute an analysis of results. This view contrasts directly with Geertz's (1973) 'thick description'. After all, decreasing the weight of the researcher does not mean extinguishing his or her role. Crude data demand meticulous treatment, which should not be confused with selecting pieces of discourse that might only reflect the researcher's preferences.
Interpreting implies positioning.
Interpreting begins as soon as we choose our universe, the moment we penetrate the field, even if it must still flow through different layers of analysis. This takes us back to the point mentioned earlier: a return to cultural, historical and sociopolitical contexts to produce social representations, meaning and communication without dismissing the reliability of circumstances. Its impacts on methodology are well known, and we must take great care when contextualizing in different plans of time and space. Let us thus extend our array of methodological possibilities into other territories, where we may incorporate different strategies whenever useful.
A related point concerns the presentation of our interpretations. Considering research as a social practice, the presentation of results is among the various steps of research. The norms of acceptance for scientific production shape the disciplinary rhetoric that turns these presentations into arguments that reinforce the study's legitimacy in that area. As stated by Bauer et al. (2000) , 'social research methodology [is] the rhetorical means by which the social sciences can strengthen their particular form of persuasion' (p. 11). The authors state that 'researchers want to convince their peers, politicians, funding sources, or even their subjects of study of the truth-value and significance of their findings' (p. 11). Thus, method and procedures would define, in addition to the path towards knowledge, the rhetorical bias that distinguishes science from other public activities. It provides legitimation at the same time. Method and procedures are the scientific means by which evidence is publicly accounted for. Nonetheless, they are also producers of this evidence, and we should be able to allow the public sphere freedom of uncensored search for evidence-a fact that should not be taken for granted. In this sense, the transparency of procedures is extremely valuable. Taking SRT as an example once more, just as an Culture & Psychology 9(4) 352 object may be submitted to representations that vary according to the group that represents it, research may also obtain a variety of readings. In the scientific arena, transparency opens research to new interpretations: every study is incomplete, it needs an external examination, and must be open to change. Every scientific study has limits. In the case of interpretative work, it is a question not of contesting it, but of verifying its plausibility. Transparency is what matters most in procedure. A study should not be simply contested, yet it can be validated once it is open to different readings. Transparency would be a prerequisite to ensure what would be the equivalent of verification in our epistemological project.
This aspect is in line with the dynamic vision of the investigative process, which in turn agrees with the dynamic vision of social representations while characteristic of current societies that are constantly changing at a dizzying pace. Data are raw materials that beg for new interpretations-whether or not from the same author-that will bring them back to life. The researcher observes different nuances each time he or she examines the same material, which proves that it has not stagnated under the first analysis, but is alive and ready to be interpreted from different angles. As long as there is transparency, it is also open to different explanations from other observers (although data are seldom available for others than the author of that investigationand here is another issue to be discussed at some other occasion). Thus transparency becomes the methodological guarantee for diversity. This means that both representations and interpretations are in constant development, and that this development occurs at the moment in which communication meets human interaction, whether scientifically or not. It also means that new understandings may be combined to discern the dynamics of these representations. Thus science meets art once its product also becomes open to interpretation.
This holographic principle that circulates between the epistemological project and methodological principles in the field of social representations (as of other culturally oriented psychological theories) highlights central points of its structure. Some of them are extremely relevant to the Brazilian experience. Perhaps there are other ways to handle the dangers of research, in this very dangerous living experience, that might redefine the concept or rigorousness. Nonetheless, SRT has served as a tool for some of us who work on a tightrope between present and future, looking towards a horizon that we have not yet unveiled. Yet we have already seen that what SRT offers, although necessary, is not always sufficient. There are challenges upstream and downstream from the theory's vision.
Living is Dangerous: Challenges to Research
There are innumerable challenges of different kinds that could be explored, but that is not the intention here. Our focus will be on those challenges that fall within the plane of compatibility between theory, its epistemological project, and methodology. Among them is the need for further development and deeper analysis of the theory. Included here are those challenges that could be classified as challenges of the day after (or by the question, What now?). In other words, once the social representations have been identified and described, what do we do with analysis efforts meant for intervention work-a fairly common practice in Brazil and in Latin America? Is understanding the dynamics or shape of the representations enough for us to address their transformation? Perhaps this is no longer within SRT's scope.
In any case, social representation studies, ever since La psychanalyse (Moscovici, 1961) , have focused their interest on cultural events generated by the transformation of certain convictions once they have become popular. The epistemological project addressed this change of rationality and its effects on culture. In reality, the power of beliefs had always interested Moscovici-it meant another form of rationality based on socially shared feelings that functioned as an engine for action in groups and populations. SRT offered an invaluable contribution when it explained how these changes occur. Today we are able to understand the structure of representations through reasonably accessible methodologies and, with a bit more effort, the processes of their construction. Yet methodologies are usually developed to deal with representations ex-post, that is, they define transformations after they have occurred, or, at best, while they are still occurring. This makes it difficult, at times, to recognize when a transformation is in the process of being structured or de-structured. All that can be said is about the fluidity of the object in the subjects' elaboration, as for mental illness (Morant & Rose, 1998) , or the transition in the subjects' identity as it affects their relation to health when they move from their home place elsewhere (Arruda, 1985; Gervais & Jovchelovitch, 1998) . Social representations studies seem to be photograms of a construction in progress. They manage to catch the changes from one moment to the other, the processes that construe the change, but hardly reach the actual movement. A group of researchers is presently studying beliefs, considering them as the source of dynamics in social life, and an important component of social representations (Apostolidis, Duveen, & Kalampalikis, 2002; Jodelet, 2002 ). Heider's advice to go deeper into conceptual development is being followed. . . .
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Once more, the symbiosis between method and theory plays a role here. What would be the method to study ongoing psychosocial processes? The study turns into an archeological survey during the processes of elaboration: we must uncover hints from the past, or even the future, in the present. In research about the central core, the comparison among groups indicates whether the schemata, the hegemonic representations and the collective memory are permanent or not. We therefore recognize the processes and structure of the construction, yet will they be able to handle deconstruction-for-reconstruction? We can detect the change that has occurred or is in the process of occurring, but how can we induce it? We identify the basis of significant factors that will bring upon the outcome, yet we are still at the inference stage. This question has been discussed to one degree or another in various writings, such as Jodelet et al.'s comprehensive research on the body (Jodelet, Ohana, Bessis-Monino, & Dannenmüller, 1980) , Morant and Rose's (1998) study about the difficulties of anchoring madness, Duveen and Lloyd's (1992) studies on children's development of gender representations, among others. However, not many longitudinal studies ('before-and-after' analyses) have been performed. In addition, studies that focus on how research results are used for change and that identify the direction from which this change may occur will require methodological efforts in order to construe a few conceptual points. Is this an acceptable challenge? Living is very dangerous indeed.
The premises of socio-constructionist theories provide the ground for innovative proposals and consequent methodological innovation. As for SRT, it has proved to serve the purpose of facilitating the change but, as indicated above, it can provide only a diagnostic collaboration. It is now being used as a qualitative approach in the Brazilian national school evaluation program, for example. To go beyond is part of the challenges we have to face. Does this mean that we are stepping into different territory? SRT does not intend to have all the answers, yet would it not have the potential to continue exploring this new terrain? I believe that it does. Another path that will help address this concern and that has guided much of our research is currently being traced in Latin America. Associating SRT with other theoretical constructs promises to be a productive means to address the issue. Banchs and Lozada (2000) have analyzed the introduction of SRT in Venezuelan practices and research in psychology as a minority proposal that influenced the field of social psychology. I myself have studied activist ecological groups and their social representations (Arruda, 1998) and discovered how an active minority elaborated answers and interpretations about the (Duveen & Lloyd, 1992 ) . Both use interviews, and questionnaires, but with different characteristics. 3. These concepts, which can be considered as 'black box' concepts, while not sufficiently and clearly explained, may continue to be objectified by the method that measures or accounts for them. Quoting Duveen (1998a) once more,
. . . clarity and precision in conceptual argument are the products of scientific activity, and not the precondition for its production. Science, like every form of human reflection, begins with a sense of what is troubling, of what stands in need of explanation. Phenomena need to be brought to light before they can be rendered intelligible. (p. 457) 
